A household's debt is judged against its income, not its neighborhood's. The same test for the federal government compares the debt with what it collects in a year, and the interest bill with the same receipts. Fiscal years back to 1940, with the Congressional Budget Office's projection for the next ten.
Federal debt divided by one year of federal receipts, at each fiscal year end. At 6× the government owes six years of everything it collects. Dashed lines right of the marker are CBO's current-law baseline (Feb 2026), not a forecast.
| Fiscal year | Debt ÷ revenue | Interest ÷ revenue | Debt ÷ GDP |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY1946 End of World War II | 6.16× | 10.5% | 106% |
| FY1974 Post-war low | 1.31× | 8.1% | 23% |
| FY1991 Previous interest peak | 2.55× | 18.4% | 44% |
| FY2001 After four surpluses | 1.67× | 10.4% | 32% |
| FY2019 Before COVID | 4.85× | 10.8% | 79% |
| FY2026 Latest full year | 6.00× | 19.5% | 101% |
| FY2036 CBO projection | 6.76× | 25.8% | 120% |
Debt here is debt held by the public. The 1946 ratio was about as high as today's, but it came down fast: the budget swung to surplus in 1947, the Fed held interest rates down until 1951 while prices rose, and the economy outgrew the debt. CBO's baseline has the ratio going from 6.00× to 6.76× by FY2036, with interest taking 25.8% of revenue.
Debt ÷ GDP is the usual headline, but GDP is the whole economy's output and the government only collects about a sixth of it. Debt ÷ revenue asks how many years of its actual income the government owes. Interest ÷ revenue asks how much of that income is spoken for before anything else: it moves with interest rates as well as the debt, which is why it fell through the 2010s while the debt kept growing, then jumped when rates rose.
In How Countries Go Broke (2025), Dalio works from 35 cases of governments going broke over the past century. His test is debt and debt service relative to income, and he watches three things: debt service against revenue, how much debt must be sold against the demand for it, and how much the central bank has to buy. In 2026 remarks he counted about $1 trillion of U.S. interest plus roughly $10 trillion of maturing debt to refinance each year, about twice federal revenue, and argued for cutting the deficit to around 3% of GDP through a mix of spending cuts, higher revenue and lower rates.
Gromen adds entitlements to interest and compares the total with tax receipts (the per-dollar bar on the Federal Budget page shows the same arithmetic). He points to the U.S. after World War II, Britain after Suez and Brazil around 2000 as cases where a government this stretched did not default outright; it held interest rates below inflation and let the currency take the loss. His expectation is that the U.S. ends up capping yields and printing the difference.
Howell's point is that debt is rarely repaid, only rolled over, so what matters is whether there is enough liquidity in the system to refinance it. He treats past crises as moments when debt outran that capacity, expects refinancing pressure to build through 2026 to 2028, and describes heavy Treasury bill issuance as a quiet way of monetizing the deficit. He doesn't give a single threshold ratio.
All three reach a similar conclusion from different directions, and the ratios here are the inputs they use. But there is no agreed danger line. Japan has carried far more debt against its economy for decades, and the U.S. borrows in a currency it issues, so the constraint shows up as inflation or a weaker dollar, not a missed payment. The honest reading: the U.S. is near the top of its own range since 1940 on debt against revenue, and unlike 1946 current law has the ratio rising from here.
Debt at fiscal year end is OMB's series (via FRED) through the last year it covers, then Treasury's daily Debt to the Penny. Receipts and interest are the same figures as the Federal Budget page. Projections are CBO's February 2026 baseline, which assumes current law and no recession. Gross debt includes what the government owes its own trust funds; debt held by the public is the part that has to be financed in the market.